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The Balkans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have attracted West-
ern amateurs of great variety. Some oﬀered their life-long devotion to the 
subjects of their aﬀection, as did Edith Durham to the Albanians (High Al-
bania, ), or Rebecca West to the Serbs (Black Lamb and the Grey Falcon. 
A Journey Through Yugoslavia, ). Others unleashed creatures of darkness 
in the Balkan habitat as did Bram Stoker with his famous Dracula and Eric 
Ambler with The Mask of Dimitrios. Another category of amateurs made 
headway in an unsuspecting readership with much sound and fury disguised 
as history. Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts even penetrated the inner sanctum 
of the White House.
The case of the Princeton-based scholar of antiquity Eugene Borza is 
more complicated. In his own Balkan past he partook in the local sport of 
appropriating the past or denying it to one’s ethnic rivals. His brief excur-
sion into modern history is both sly and innocent. Sly in intent but innocent 
of the modern terrain. Borza was “stunned” (p. ) by the discovery of a 
gravestone in the Baldwin cemetery of Steelton Pennsylvania, describing 
its inhabitant as a “Macedon”. This he concluded was evidence of ethno-
genesis. Had he visited other immigrant communities in the northwestern 
United States he would have discovered a plethora of Macedonian (Greek, 
Bulgarian or Albanian), Peloponnesian, Cretan etc, appellations signifying 
local, rather than ethnic origin. Such designations of clubs, newspapers and 
tombstones since the early twentieth century abound throughout the habi-
tat of immigrants with a strong attachment to their locale of origin.
 For more examples, see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford, ) and 
Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritanie. The Imperialism of the Imagination (Yale Uni-
versity Press, ).
 Eugene N. Borza, “Macedonia Redux”, in Frances B. Titchener and Richard F. Moor-
ton, Jr, The Eye Expanded (University of California Press, ), -.
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Former US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot’s article “Self-Deter-
mination in an Interdependent World” is indicative of how one’s foreign 
policy can lead to unexpected developments when the diagnosis of the ail-
ment is based on questionable premises. Mr. Talbot’s attempt “to apply the 
concept of self-determination in a way that is conducive to integration and 
not to disintegration” succeeded in producing the opposite outcome. Even 
after the events of , he believes that his administration is trying “to re-
make the politics of the region without, this time, having to redraw the map, 
without splitting up large, repressive, or failed states into small, fractious 
ministates that are neither economically nor politically viable”. A quick look 
at the Western Balkans conﬁrms Mr. Talbot’s worst fears. His view of Bos-
nia is that this country has tried to “give all citizens reason to feel that they 
belong to a single state – not so much a nation state, as a multiethnic federal 
state. There is reason for cautious optimism about reaching this goal”. Yet 
Bosnia remains as segregated as ever. On Kosovo he insists that “the Kos-
ovars have historically wanted – and under Yugoslav President Josip Broz 
Tito enjoyed – a high degree of autonomy. Then, under President Slobodan 
Milošević, they suﬀered a decade of Serbian oppression and more than a 
year of ethnic cleansing. Now they want more than just self-determina-
tion: They want total independence”. However, the history of the Albanian 
Kosovars since they found themselves unwillingly in the Kingdom of Serbia 
() does not conform with Mr. Talbot’s view that their option for inde-
pendence is the exclusive outcome of Milošević’s repression.
The fact that the uniﬁcation of Kosovo with Albania during the Sec-
ond World War was well received by the Albanian population and the sub-
sequent uprisings of the Albanian element against Tito’s arrangements, defy 
Mr. Talbot’s interpretation. His assessment that autonomy is still an option 
for the Kosovars “within a larger democratic, federalized, multiethnic state”,
if Serbia becomes democratic, is wide oﬀ the mark. A democratic regime 
could have materialized in Serbia if the Kosovar Albanians had chosen to 
throw their full electoral weight against Milošević in past and recent elec-
tions. They chose to abstain, to avoid legitimizing a state they did not want 
to be part of. Some, according to rumours, even secretly voted for Milošević 
to precipitate the breakdown that would lead to their independence.
Mr. Talbot’s line is shared by many Western commentators. Most 
refuse to come to terms with a reality of warring ethnic nationalisms that 
 Foreign Policy (Spring ), -.
 Ibid., .
 Ibid.
 Ibid., .
 Ibid.
Th. Veremis, Western Amateurs in the Balkans 239
resist reconciliation through democratic symbiosis. When, for example, 
this author put the question to George Soros whether a democratic Serbia 
would induce the Kosovars to return to the fold of FRY as an autonomous 
entity or a Republic, he did not get a clear answer. Western oﬃcials pay 
lip-service to the goal of acculturating multiethnic states to the ways of the 
free market economy and multicultural existence without explaining how 
this will come to pass. According to former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
Warren Zimmermann, “If the world is to support the idea of multiethnicity 
as an organising principle for states … then it will have to do more to ensure 
the protection of minorities within multiethnic states.” Yet ﬁve years after 
Dayton, Bosnia is more of a segregated, aid-dependent protectorate than 
ever.
Mr. Talbot’s unhistorical mantra is repeated by the authors of Win-
ning Ugly. “The fact that Kosovo’s Albanians are now eﬀectively in charge 
of the province – and that they should remain in control of at least most of 
it, whether through autonomy within Serbia, republic status within Yugo-
slavia, or eventual independence – has nothing to do with original claims to 
the land. It has instead to do with the treatment of the Kosovar Albanians 
by Slobodan Milosevic and his fellow Serb nationalists in recent times.” 
The overlapping and conﬂicting irredentisms of Serbs and Albanians have 
everything to do with the present state of aﬀairs in Kosovo. To say that 
latter-day nationalists in Serbia bear the sole responsibility for current de-
velopments is like saying that the Franco-German rivalry was invented by 
Hitler.
A brief review of Balkan developments may be necessary to place this 
author’s premises in perspective.
The Balkans have never constituted a regional continuum, except 
during the centuries of Ottoman rule that gave them their name. In ethnic 
and cultural terms they have been as diversiﬁed as any geographic region 
of Europe be it Western, Northern, Southern or Central. In ethnic and 
linguistic terms, Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia are similar, while FYROM and 
Bulgaria share linguistic and cultural legacies. Although Romania, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Serbia and FYROM have Christian Orthodox majorities, this has 
not prevented them from ﬁghting on opposite camps. The Muslim element 
in Bosnia, Albania, Serbia and FYROM have not cooperated in the past, 
except as ethnic Albanians. Having remained outside Europe’s mainstream 
 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, ), .
 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly. NATO’s War to Save Kosovo
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, ), .
 The term here includes Yugoslavia (and its successor states), Albania, Greece, Roma-
nia and Bulgaria.
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for centuries, Balkan societies failed to synchronize their development with 
the state-building process of Western Europe.
The disparate record of emerging Balkan states in attaining indepen-
dence throughout the nineteenth and even as late as the twentieth century 
and their intermittent eﬀorts at constructing administrative and parliamen-
tary institutions, were never free of European politics. Their irredentist wars 
against Ottoman rule and the resultant borders were closely supervised by 
foreign patrons and regulated by the principles that governed European 
relations. If the First World War restructured the boundaries of the Balkans 
and aﬀorded a period of relative freedom from great power involvement, 
the communist era that followed the Second World War imposed Soviet 
inﬂuence and impeded Balkan development along Western lines.
The process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration began a decade before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall when the need for economic and administrative re-
form came at odds with long standing trends of the Federation’s decen-
tralization. Yugoslavia’s access to Western capital markets throughout the 
sixties and seventies, and its inability to service its Western debts after the 
second oil shock, confronted the Federal leadership with a dire predica-
ment. The measures dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
required constitutional reform to strengthen the central Government’s abil-
ity to implement an austerity policy. In  the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia (LCY) leadership appointed a party commission to discuss the 
political system. The Commission’s preliminary proposals for amendments 
to the  Constitution soon entered public debate which revealed the 
anti-federalist sentiments of the more prosperous Republics. Furthermore 
the pressure of the West, favoured less, rather than more, government in-
terference in the economy, free-market reform and privatization. In other 
words, Yugoslavia was getting mixed messages from its Western creditors 
and its Western political friends to increase and to reduce central author-
ity at the same time. Those Republics whose views on this matter seemed 
more liberal and Western were in fact catering to the interests of the ethnic 
groups they represented. They were of course the ﬁrst to bolt the Federa-
tion.
Of the states and institutions outside the region of Southeastern Eu-
rope, the European Union initially wielded the greatest inﬂuence. From 
its early support for the unity of Yugoslavia as a precondition for future 
 Susan Woodward’s analysis, among the many that attempted to trace the causes of 
Yugoslavia’s implosion, is perhaps the most observant of the Federation’s history. Balkan
Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington DC: The Brookings In-
stitution, ), -, , , -.
 Ibid.
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application to the Brussels EPS meeting of the twelve Foreign Ministers 
on – December , the EU performed an about face. Within “half 
a year the EC had moved from a uniﬁed position on the maintenance of 
the Yugoslav state, to a common but harshly discordant policy on inviting 
those republics seeking independence to submit applications and undergo 
the procedure identiﬁed.” This decision was prompted by Germany’s insis-
tence on the immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia which initiated 
a trend that could not be conﬁned to the two Republics.
Washington at ﬁrst supported Serbian reluctance to abandon Yugo-
slav unity. However, in his July  visit to Yugoslavia, Secretary of State 
James Baker stated that his government would not object to a peaceful pro-
cess leading to independence, however unlikely that was. By the Spring of 
, the US had cast its lot for the recognition of the Republics.
Politicians and diplomats, well-versed in regional politics and irre-
dentist strife, warned the EU of the violence that a break-up of Yugoslavia 
would unleash. Their prediction was that recognition of secessionist unitary 
states, in which preponderant ethnic forces held sway over their own minor-
ities, would provoke a chain reaction until, eventually, the process of disinte-
gration led to a plethora of ethnically pure but unworkable neighbourhood 
entities. In a conference on Balkan developments, jointly sponsored by the 
Woodrow Wilson Center and the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft in Potsdam 
(– June ), this author expressed his own worries over the future of 
the region:
The most ominous development in Yugoslavia is the proliferation of 
weak and mutually hostile state entities in a region, which does not 
at the present moment constitute a high priority for the West. In 
that sense the Balkans are no longer the powder keg of Europe but 
a decaying backwater cut oﬀ from the prospect of communication 
with the Western Community. The implosion of nationalist strife 
of Yugoslavia can still create a chain reaction of developments that 
would undermine the economies of adjacent states and determine 
the future of the Balkans as the third world of Europe.
Since , the adjacent states have lost valuable trade and, as a result, 
smuggling and corruption have prevailed in a sizeable black market econ-
omy. Furthermore they were cut oﬀ from the rest of Europe, as a result of 
embargoes and political decisions that directly aﬀected their capacity for 
growth.
 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War
(London: Hurst, ), -.
 T. Veremis, “Eine Neudeﬁnition der Sicherheitsbehange in Südosteuropa”, Südosteu-
ropa Mitteilungen / (), .
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The  bombings by NATO put an end to Serbian advance in Bos-
nia. The Dayton Agreement of  November  that followed was en-
gineered by a superpower whose timing was perfect. In the summer that 
preceded the bombings, the Croatian forces evicted the Serbs from Krajina, 
while the Serbs cleansed most of Eastern Bosnia. The contours of an eth-
nically segregated Bosnia were oﬃcially settled on paper. The American 
success in pacifying the region may have been partly a question of good 
timing but it also signiﬁed the failure of the EU to produce and enforce a 
viable solution.
The Dayton achievement in freezing the Bosnian conﬂict made Bos-
nia-Herzegovina totally dependent on the West. Even the development of 
its democratic institutions is supervised by outside forces and some of its 
elected leaders are sacked when they fail to meet Western standards. The 
three ethnically cleansed sectors of the state, however, continue their sepa-
rate lives without promoting the multicultural coexistence which became 
the hallmark of Western intervention.
For Americans the role of arbiter in Western Balkan aﬀairs has been 
a novel experience. With an administration that considers the region an 
embarrassment rather than a strategic asset, the US has since tried to apply 
its panacea of free market and democratic institutions with little patience. 
So we are now beginning to realize that such institutions take time to devel-
op and that therefore a premature withdrawal of the SFOR or the KFOR 
could cause havoc to recur.
Serbia’s superior command of ﬁrepower had been its greatest weak-
ness in the depiction of the Yugoslav conﬂict by the Western media. Hav-
ing committed the largest percentage of atrocities among the belligerents, 
she steadily became the main target of CNN and US attention. As a result, 
there was a marked change in Western policy favouring the adversaries of 
Serbia as the weaker parts in the conﬂict. Naturally, the Kosovo Albanians 
were the weakest of all the victims.
Was it only a question of principles that led to military involvement 
in Bosnia, or did this also serve special interests of the EU and the USA? 
The report of the International Commission on the Balkans, in one of its more 
candid moments, explains why “the fate of Islam in Bosnia is of importance 
for reasons going beyond the country or even the Balkans: ) it has become 
a factor in the West’s relations with the Islamic world; ) it might become 
important for Turkey’s relationship with Europe; and ) it has implications 
for the Islamic communities of Western Europe”. There is no mention in 
the report as to why the Serbs should consider the West’s relations with the 
 Unﬁnished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Washing-
ton DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace and Aspen Institute, ), .
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Islamic world their own priority. If there had been, the Serbs could have 
been gently ushered into a communality of interests with a European com-
munity that they aspired to join.
Western policy vis-à-vis Kosovo was prompted by the Bosnian prec-
edent, and the Dayton Accord. Unlike Bosnia, however, Kosovo has been a 
province of Serbia since the Balkan Wars of – and a territory replete 
with Serbian history and religious shrines. Whereas Dayton conﬁrmed a 
fait accompli in the ﬁeld, Kosovo had remained under ﬁrm Serb adminis-
tration, until the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) began to challenge the 
authority of Belgrade. Apparently the goal of the UCK was to provoke 
the Serb authorities into violent reprisals that would capture the attention 
of the West and compel it to act. In the cat-and-mouse game that ensued 
between the Serb forces and the UCK, an outside intervention could only 
keep them apart by committing ground troops of the SFOR type.
Mr. Holbrooke’s agreement with Milošević in October  for 
a partial Serb withdrawal from Kosovo failed to address the absence of 
ground troops that could have prevented the UCK from ﬁlling the vacu-
um in the ﬁeld. Although Milosevic was adverse to the presence of foreign 
troops in what he considered to be Serbian sovereign territory, at the same 
time he was compelled by UCK action to launch large-scale operations that 
compromised Serbia internationally. Before the West came to Rambouillet, 
the possibility of committing an SFOR type of contingency to supervise 
the October  agreement had not been exhausted. The participation of 
Russians in a force that would have ensured the orderly departure of large 
numbers of Serb troops and the passivity of the UCK, might have been 
possible if the Americans had not persisted in excluding the Russians. The 
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement brought back displaced Albanians to their 
homes, but the absence of an enforcement mechanism exposed the agree-
ment to contraventions by the adversaries. An accurate picture of the ex-
cesses committed between October  and March  when the bomb-
ing began, is probably included in the report of the , OSCE observers 
in Kosovo. The Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia James Bissett noted 
that this valuable piece of evidence, which has so far escaped the atten-
tion of commentators, has not been given to the public by the OSCE.
Regardless of whether the report is damning to Serb operations, or not, the 
Rambouillet ultimatum was seen by Milošević as a violation of his country’s 
territorial integrity. NATO’s demand to be granted access to the entire FRY 
 In the Canadian Globe and Mail,  January .
 Neither Tim Judah, Kosovo-War and Revenge (London: Yale University Press, ), 
nor Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, mention this lacuna.
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gave the then Federal President the opportunity to present his refusal as an 
act of resistance against foreign occupation.
If actions are not to be judged by intentions but by outcomes, then 
the operation of bombing the FRY was a mistake. NATO devastated a 
centrally located Balkan state in order to rid its people of Milošević, to save 
the imperilled Kosovar Albanians and to secure multiethnic coexistence in 
an autonomous province. However, it succeeded in achieving the opposite 
on all counts. After Bosnia, Kosovo is (or will soon be) yet another ethni-
cally cleansed protectorate of the West with a Liberation Army (UCK) that 
has declared its irredentist designs against the neighbouring states. In the 
ethnic antagonisms over territory, NATO has clearly taken sides and the 
US agenda for a multiethnic, multicultural Western Balkans has failed.
Of all the commentators of US policy in Kosovo, Henry Kissinger 
is the great exception that veriﬁes the rule. His Hobbesian view of hu-
man nature, his historical erudition and his careful computation of national 
interest, make him perhaps the most accomplished of the anti-Lockean 
mavericks of American oﬃcialdom. With a series of articles (April , May 
 and June , ) Kissinger strove to salvage European history from 
the administration’s onslaught. In the grand tradition of nineteenth-century 
conservative statesmen that he admires, he is wary of humanitarian causes 
with unpredictable outcomes. His criticism of Mrs. Albright’s achievement 
in Kosovo and his remedy to the present impasse certainly challenge main-
stream views on the subject, “If we try to implement the UN resolution 
for any length of time, we will emerge as the permanent party to arcane 
and bitter Balkan quarrels. It would be far wiser to cut the Gordian knot 
and concede Kosovar independence as part of an overall Balkan settlement 
– perhaps including self-determination for each of the three ethnic groups 
of Bosnia. In such an arrangement, the borders of Kosovo and its neigh-
bours should be guaranteed by NATO or the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. As in Bosnia, the international forces would then 
patrol both sides of these borders for at least a substantial interim period.”
Kissinger’s admonitions do not sound hollow. By intervening, the US has 
made its presence a determining factor in shaping the future of the region. 
The Western Balkans have therefore become again a great power’s protec-
 The accounts of the Rambouillet deliberations, especially that of Judah, leave little to 
be desired. Judah, Kosovo-War, -; Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, -.
 Chris Hedges, “As UN Organizes, Rebels are Taking Charge of Kosovo”, The New 
York Times,  July .
 See view of Deputy Commander in Chief of US European Command, Charles G. 
Boyd, “Making Peace with the Guilty”, Foreign Aﬀairs (Sept/Oct ), -.
 Henry Kissinger, “As the Cheers Fade”, Newsweek,  June .
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torate, as they have been so often in the past. The paradox in this exceptional 
Western involvement in an ever growing number of protectorates (Bosnia, 
Kosovo, FYROM, Albania) is that unlike the Cold War period, the region 
does not constitute a US, NATO or EU priority, but is more of an exporter 
of immigrants and a generator of trouble for the rest of Europe. Given the 
scarcity of Western resources allocated for the reconstruction of the region, 
the Yugoslav black hole may become the cause of a wider contagion of eco-
nomic decay.
The miraculous change of regime in the FRY following the Septem-
ber  elections has become the single most heartening development in 
the Western Balkans for a very long time.
A permanent slide into barbarism is not among the likely contingen-
cies that threaten the Western Balkans. Such strife as we have seen through-
out the Kosovo crisis will recede. We should also not forget that nation states 
in most European cases have been unicultural institutions promoting their 
own exclusivity at the expense of the “others”. It was the immense, material 
and moral devastation of WWII, as well as the Soviet threat, that induced 
the Europeans to take up the experiment of multilateralism and multicul-
turalism in the post-war period. The Balkans as an appendage of Western 
Europe adopted the state-building process and the ideological trappings 
of its Western prototype with some delay. The dissolution of Yugoslavia 
revealed the other side of irredentism – ethnic cleansing. If a state cannot 
expand its territory, it can certainly cleanse it from its undesirable ethnic 
minorities, especially if they are perceived as a security threat.
The US did not intervene in Bosnia and Kosovo to facilitate ethnical-
ly pure microprotectorates, but multicultural democratic federations, after 
its own image. The Americans are dedicated to multiculturalism although 
they remain a multiethnic society with a single political culture. Their virtu-
ous undertaking in the Western Balkans foundered in this misconception 
and in the structural American contempt for history. When the founding 
fathers turned their backs to the English throne, centuries of convoluted 
history froze and the future was illuminated by the manifest destiny of the 
new nation. The end of history happened in the eighteenth century for the 
Americans; they expected it to occur at the end of the twentieth century for 
the rest of the world.
What can the West do to prevent the regional rift from widening?
) Qualify economic aid and channel it to the restoration of the infra-
structure. (The Marshall plan after all was about development not ﬁnancing 
 Martin Sletzinger, “The Consequences of the War in Kosovo”, in Kosovo & NATO. 
Impending Challenges (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, East European Studies, ), -.
Balcanica XXXVI246
Western advisers and NGOs.) ) Stop believing that Democracy can be 
transplanted on fallow ground. ) Encourage regional and local cooperation 
initiatives as an ante-chamber to future EU accession. ) Keep a Western 
military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo to maintain order and help the 
locals restore a stable and predictable state of aﬀairs. The UNMIK should 
gradually give way to local authorities. ) If Serbia remains the economic 
black hole it is today, its population will continue to leave a land that can 
no longer support them. ) Western and especially American policy-makers 
should become more reverential of history. Its end is nowhere in sight.
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